In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix i_disksize exceeding i_size problem in paritally written case It is possible for i_disksize can exceed i_size, triggering a warning. generic_perform_write copied = iov_iter_copy_from_user_atomic(len) // copied < len ext4_da_write_end | ext4_update_i_disksize | new_i_size = pos + copied; | WRITE_ONCE(EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize, newsize) // update i_disksize | generic_write_end | copied = block_write_end(copied, len) // copied = 0 | if (unlikely(copied < len)) | if (!PageUptodate(page)) | copied = 0; | if (pos + copied > inode->i_size) // return false if (unlikely(copied == 0)) goto again; if (unlikely(iov_iter_fault_in_readable(i, bytes))) { status = -EFAULT; break; } We get i_disksize greater than i_size here, which could trigger WARNING check 'i_size_read(inode) < EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize' while doing dio: ext4_dio_write_iter iomap_dio_rw __iomap_dio_rw // return err, length is not aligned to 512 ext4_handle_inode_extension WARN_ON_ONCE(i_size_read(inode) < EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize) // Oops WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2609 at fs/ext4/file.c:319 CPU: 2 PID: 2609 Comm: aa Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2 RIP: 0010:ext4_file_write_iter+0xbc7 Call Trace: vfs_write+0x3b1 ksys_write+0x77 do_syscall_64+0x39 Fix it by updating 'copied' value before updating i_disksize just like ext4_write_inline_data_end() does. A reproducer can be found in the buganizer link below.
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