In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/erofs/fileio: call erofs_onlinefolio_split() after bio_add_folio() If bio_add_folio() fails (because it is full), erofs_fileio_scan_folio() needs to submit the I/O request via erofs_fileio_rq_submit() and allocate a new I/O request with an empty `struct bio`. Then it retries the bio_add_folio() call. However, at this point, erofs_onlinefolio_split() has already been called which increments `folio->private`; the retry will call erofs_onlinefolio_split() again, but there will never be a matching erofs_onlinefolio_end() call. This leaves the folio locked forever and all waiters will be stuck in folio_wait_bit_common(). This bug has been added by commit ce63cb62d794 ("erofs: support unencoded inodes for fileio"), but was practically unreachable because there was room for 256 folios in the `struct bio` - until commit 9f74ae8c9ac9 ("erofs: shorten bvecs[] for file-backed mounts") which reduced the array capacity to 16 folios. It was now trivial to trigger the bug by manually invoking readahead from userspace, e.g.: posix_fadvise(fd, 0, st.st_size, POSIX_FADV_WILLNEED); This should be fixed by invoking erofs_onlinefolio_split() only after bio_add_folio() has succeeded. This is safe: asynchronous completions invoking erofs_onlinefolio_end() will not unlock the folio because erofs_fileio_scan_folio() is still holding a reference to be released by erofs_onlinefolio_end() at the end.
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3 reference(s) from NVD