A vulnerability in the tail utility of uutils coreutils allows for the exfiltration of sensitive file contents when using the --follow=name option. Unlike GNU tail, the uutils implementation continues to monitor a path after it has been replaced by a symbolic link, subsequently outputting the contents of the link's target. In environments where a privileged user (e.g., root) monitors a log directory, a local attacker with write access to that directory can replace a log file with a symlink to a sensitive system file (such as /etc/shadow), causing tail to disclose the contents of the sensitive file.
Get an AI-powered plain-language explanation of this vulnerability and remediation steps.
Login to generate AI explanationCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
2 reference(s) from NVD